Interface: InteractionSessionOptions

Defined in: src/traverse/nav-session.ts:56

Extends

• Omit<SessionOptions, "node">

Properties

allowUnmaterializedFires?

optional allowUnmaterializedFires?: boolean

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:952

Let AGENT fires of declared-but-unbound tools proceed as honest no-ops (executed: false, materialized: false on the result) instead of the default NOT_MATERIALIZED rejection. For guide/tour/plan flows — the Phase-0 rung walking the graph without touching the app. Navigation claims still move the cursor (that is the tour); re-sync() before trusting position. Default false (fail-closed).

Inherited from

SessionOptions.allowUnmaterializedFires

attributionPolicy?

optional attributionPolicy?: AttributionPolicy

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:1084

HOW HARD THIS SESSION IS ALLOWED TO GUESS when a state report does not say which fire it is about. Default 'default' — today's ladder, byte for byte.

'strict' turns off the two rungs that are guesses:

• FIFO ('queue-order') is never used. Arrival order is not evidence.
• a signature match must be UNAMBIGUOUS — nothing else pending may even partly explain the delta (traverse/attribution.ts, THE SIGNATURE RULE).

An unplaceable delta is then recorded as an 'unknown' stimulus and the fire STAYS PENDING rather than being falsely closed. That is the trade, and it is the whole reason this is opt-in: a fire that never gets its report waits forever, visibly (Session.pending, Session.awaitingSettlement), instead of quietly borrowing somebody else's report. Apps whose taps pass transitionId lose nothing at all.

The STAMP is not affected by this option: every transition carries its Attribution in both modes, because disclosure is never a policy.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.attributionPolicy

captureProduced?

optional captureProduced?: boolean

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:943

Capture each handler's RETURN value onto its transition (sanitized+capped) as the "act → get data back" channel — TransitionRecord.produced. Default true. Set false to opt a session out entirely (handlers whose returns are internal and should never reach the agent).

Inherited from

SessionOptions.captureProduced

checkPayloadShape?

optional checkPayloadShape?: boolean

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:967

Check a plain JSON-Schema declaration against the payload at fire time. STRUCTURAL only — required keys, declared primitive types, closed objects — and never a full JSON-Schema validator: anything it cannot judge it passes (the name says exactly what it does, because claiming more would be a lie a caller only discovers in production).

Default true. Declaring a schema is already the author's opt-in signal, and Mode B's published contract has always promised that "a wrong input returns a structured error RESULT carrying what was expected" (serve/modes.ts) — a promise a plain JSON Schema could not keep while nothing enforced it. Set false for the 0.3.0 pass-through. Zod and other parseable validators run either way; this flag governs only the plain-JSON-Schema branch.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.checkPayloadShape

commitValues?

optional commitValues?: "full" | "delta"

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:934

Commit-log value encoding (footprintjs dial). Default 'delta'.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.commitValues

dormantGraceMs?

optional dormantGraceMs?: number

Defined in: src/traverse/nav-session.ts:65

How long a registration outside the router-confirmed page may persist before drift telemetry fires (a dev warning + one sensor-drift gap row). Registrations in that window are DORMANT: held, not offered, activated instantly if the router then confirms their page. Default 3000ms.

effectPolicy?

optional effectPolicy?: EffectPolicy

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:1105

REQUIRE THAT A HIGH-EFFECT ACTION CAN BE CHECKED. Off by default. See EffectPolicy — and note the thing it deliberately does not do: 'state-delta' does not satisfy it, because key presence is not value correctness.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.effectPolicy

enforcePrincipalPolicy?

optional enforcePrincipalPolicy?: boolean

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:1098

ENFORCE what actions declare in PrincipalPolicy. Off by default, and with it off every such declaration is disclosure exactly as humanDecides is — the same byte-identical stance every enforcement in this library takes.

On, two things become refusals: a fire from a principal outside an action's mayInvoke list (PRINCIPAL_NOT_ALLOWED, naming the kinds required), and a fire of an action that declared requiresHumanApproval with no recorded approval to present (the existing APPROVAL_* words — no new vocabulary).

decisionOwner is NEVER enforced by this switch. An owner is not a permission; an app that wants the agent kept out says mayInvoke: ['human'].

Inherited from

SessionOptions.enforcePrincipalPolicy

freshness?

optional freshness?: FreshnessPolicy

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:1022

THE SESSION'S DEFAULT ANSWER on each freshness axis, for every action that does not answer for itself. Off by default in the only way that matters: an unanswered axis is 'disclose', which is what every release before this one did, so a session that omits this option serves the same bytes and refuses the same fires it always did.

map.createSession({ node: 'ledger', state, freshness: { writeChanges: 'require-ack' } });

An action's own freshness wins AXIS BY AXIS — a session default of 'refuse' on writes and an action declaring { writeChanges: 'disclose' } leaves that one control disclosing while the rest refuse. See FreshnessPolicy, and note the one thing enforcement adds to the door: an enforcing axis requires the fire to cite an offer (FireOptions.offerId).

Inherited from

SessionOptions.freshness

maxAcknowledgements?

optional maxAcknowledgements?: number

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:1064

HOW MANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPTS a session keeps before dropping the oldest. Default 500.

The ACKNOWLEDGEMENT_REQUIRED → acknowledge → refire loop writes one row per turn, so session.acknowledgements() grows for as long as a session lives. Bounding it means a cited receipt can expire, so eviction is COUNTED (session.acknowledgementsDropped()), WARNED once, and refused by its own word (ACKNOWLEDGEMENT_REQUIRED with why: 'evicted') rather than reported as a pointer the caller made up.

Unlike SessionOptions.maxOffers, the warning here is said to every session that fills it: nothing enters this ledger except through an explicit acknowledgeStale call, so it can never reach somebody who switched nothing on.

Nothing is ever edited or retracted — the cap drops the oldest rows whole, and a retained row says exactly what it always said. Raising it costs memory and nothing else; the rows hold action ids, key NAMES and numbers.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.maxAcknowledgements

maxOffers?

optional maxOffers?: number

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:1043

How many OfferRecords this session retains before dropping the oldest. Default 500.

The ledger is bounded because it is written from a read path — available() is called on every look, on every refused fire's gap row, on every served reply — and an unbounded session-lifetime map fed from a read path is a leak with a friendly name. Bounding it means a citation can expire, so eviction is COUNTED (session.offersDropped()), WARNED once, and refused by its own word (OFFER_NOT_ON_RECORD with why: 'evicted') rather than reported as an id that never existed.

The COUNT is kept on every session; the WARNING is said only to a session that requires a citation somewhere (SessionOptions.freshness, or an action's own). Nothing expires under a session that opted into nothing, so there is nothing there to tune.

Raising it costs memory and nothing else; the records hold key NAMES and numbers, never a value.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.maxOffers

navigate?

optional navigate?: (href) => void | Promise<void>

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:979

The caller's OWN router navigation (e.g. (href) => router.push(href)). PRESENCE of this option is the opt-in: with it, an edge whose gesture yields a literal href — an explicit url binding, else the fully-literal route of the page it claims to navigate to — materialises through this function, so a pure URL navigation no longer needs a fake do-nothing handler to get past NOT_MATERIALIZED. Registered handlers still win, and the synthesized navigation rides the SAME invocation machinery: resolve → effectStatus 'performed'; throw → 'refused' with the honest rollback. Without this option nothing changes — fail-closed, byte-identical.

Parameters

href

string

Returns

void | Promise<void>

Inherited from

SessionOptions.navigate

node?

optional node?: string

Defined in: src/traverse/nav-session.ts:58

Starting page id. Default: the first declared page.

now?

optional now?: () => number

Defined in: src/traverse/nav-session.ts:72

The clock the dormancy / overlay-grace timers read (epoch ms). Defaults to Date.now. Inject a controllable clock to test time-dependent staleness deterministically — a dormant registration, a mount-grace warning — without real waits (hcifootprint/testing's harness wires one for you).

Returns

number

Overrides

SessionOptions.now

onWarn?

optional onWarn?: (message) => void

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:936

Dev-warning sink (StrictMode re-registrations, handler errors). Default console.warn.

Parameters

message

string

Returns

void

Inherited from

SessionOptions.onWarn

redactedFields?

optional redactedFields?: RedactedFields

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:932

Fields to hide INSIDE the data a transition carries — a fire's payload, a handler's return. The sibling of redactedKeys (which governs state keys and never touched a payload), aimed per channel and opt-in: absent, nothing changes. See RedactedFields.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.redactedFields

redactedKeys?

optional redactedKeys?: string[]

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:925

Keys stored as 'REDACTED' in the commit log while live state keeps raw values.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.redactedKeys

requireHumanApproval?

optional requireHumanApproval?: boolean | HumanApprovalPolicy

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:1003

REQUIRE A RECORDED HUMAN APPROVAL before an agent may fire a high-effect action. Off by default; with it on, a high-effect agent fire is refused unless it carries FireOptions.askId — a pointer to a confirm-journal row a person's own Approve control recorded (Session.approveAsk), or a standing ALWAYS ALLOW (Session.alwaysApprove).

WHAT IT FIXES. confirm: true was the AGENT asserting that a human approved: a boolean in the model's own tool arguments, tied to nothing. A model that never asked was indistinguishable from one that got a yes. With this option the proof is a POINTER to a decision a person recorded, so "the model asked politely" stops being part of the security model.

WHAT IT DOES NOT PROVE. That a particular person authenticated — by is a string your host supplies — and not that your own wiring keeps the approval door out of the model's reach. It proves that a row of the right kind, from the right principal, for this action and this input, exists and has not already been spent.

Pass true for the plain policy, or a HumanApprovalPolicy to also refuse a yes that has gone stale. Without this option nothing changes — fail-closed, byte-identical.

Inherited from

SessionOptions.requireHumanApproval

state?

optional state?: Record<string, unknown>

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:915

Initial projected state (the lean snapshot guards read — not the whole app).

Inherited from

SessionOptions.state

stateTap?

optional stateTap?: boolean

Defined in: src/atom/types.ts:923

Whether this session receives updateState() reports (a router/store tap). Default: true when state was provided, false otherwise. Without a tap, declared-writes fires settle on handler completion (or immediately when nothing executes) with effectVerified 'unobservable' — instead of staying pending forever (the D18 rung-killer fix).

Inherited from

SessionOptions.stateTap